Reflection of corruption in the development of economic theories by Volejníková, Jolana
EKONOMIE
E + M EKONOMIE A MANAGEMENT 2 / 2009 strana 15
Introduction
Our deeper interest in problems of corruption 
supports that the problems of corruption in the 
field of economics is scientifically studied only on 
a small scale. It does not stand on the first place, 
often it is derogated and transferred to the area 
of politics, psychology or sociology. Generally 
maybe because it supposes that in comparison e. 
g. with problems of unemployment or convertible 
currency, it concerns about trivial problem or the-
re is not give (in economic literature) practically 
any attention to bribery of civil officers by reason 
of illegal character of this problems (as Murray 
Rothbard presents it in book „Economics of go-
vernment´s intervention“). However, according 
to Rothbard the theoretic economics „... should 
analyse all aspects of exchange whether it is legal 
exchange or illegal exchange“ [23]. We share the 
same opinion. That is why we attempt to map the 
reflection of corruption in historical development 
of economic theories in the following text.
1. Corruption in Early Economic 
Thinking
Corruption, traditionally connected with the 
existence of state, state system, government, 
policy and authority, always belonged to the area 
of justice, policy and ethic, at a later time even 
to area of psychology and sociology, than to 
economics. Provided that the problem of corrup-
tion was theoretically assumed, it stayed in this 
context despite the fact that economics had been 
considered as a part of policy or ethic philosophy 
for a long time. Natural, primary interest of 
economists in interpretation of economic 
phenomena did not set the question of cor-
ruption among areas of this interest becau-
se the problem of corruption behaviour was 
not perceived as economic problem. Till the 
thirtieth years of the twentieth century economic 
theory did not deal with problem of market failure, 
bureaucracy, growing economic state partici-
pation in regulation of economy and increasing 
requirements of state regulations or problems of 
internationalization and globalization in terms of 
economic activities. Nowadays we know that all 
these areas are connected with corruption risks.
It is impossible to notice that deprecation and 
denouncement of corruption, that was always 
connected with high moral requirements posed 
to statesmen and politicians, had also its econo-
mic aspects. A lot of historic sources supported 
that almost any official or unofficial delegation 
brought certain gifts. Primary mission of these 
gifts was to create helpful atmosphere for nego-
tiation and demonstrate as one side appreciates 
the other side and as well as in the case that 
there was conctracted nothing concrete. In offi-
cial level of relations the matter of presentation 
posed more often rather reasonable calculation 
than personal and emotive matter. Thus, from 
gifts becomes bribe whose purpose is to acquire 
anything that would demand increased costs 
(time, effort, investments) in the case of common 
conditions. Latin locution „do, et des“- „I give so 
that you give“ perfectly describes the principle of 
this phenomenon.
Corruption occurred both in Egypt - Egyptian 
pharaohs, ancient Greece and Roman Empire. 
Inhabitants of Athens as the first required for 
politicians to give reasons for their public ex-
penditures. It occurred in front of 501 citizens 
judicatory whose resolutions could be affirmed or 
annulled by demotic judges. This democratic ju-
diciary was deformed by syfocants, professional 
informers and extortionists who threatened with 
denouncement to wealthies if they went against 
their tall requirements. „They exhibited defama-
tory charges against the rich so that they could 
seize their possession“ [18]. Roman criminal 
law dispensed maximum punishment - the death 
penalty - not only for murder but also for bribery 
of electors (crimen ambitu). The death penalty 
was common even for the treachery of client and 
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false witness. All these crimes were punished by 
decapitation and in the case of election corrupti-
on there were punished also citizens by means 
of permanently deprivation of their electorship. 
Warning against the connection of corruption 
and power we can discover at Platon´s idea 
of ideal state. According to him neither rulers or 
warriors should not dispose of private property 
because wealth corrupts, destroy morality and 
leads to preferring own egoistic interests befo-
re interests of the state. Platon maintained that 
corrupt may not be only individual but also the 
whole institution. He considered the tyranny as 
corrupt form of monarchy because it does not 
comply with laws, it only serves to interests of 
tyrannizer. In the track of Platon there continued 
Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau. They 
considered corruption as „ulcer on the body of 
policy“ and believed that demoralized political 
rule did not enable to own members to behave 
unlike incorrectly. Aristoteles, Platon´s learner, 
denounced the sins of politicians in his papers 
„...a great number of politicians really does not 
merit this title because politician do noble-min-
ded achievements because of achievements as 
such, but high number of people tends to this way 
of life only for own enrichment and because of 
their ambition, (...) most people hungers rather for 
wealth than for honours, (...), when anyone is ab-
solute master in the world he can not afraid that 
he will be hard up“ [2]. However, he reproached 
also doubt economic practices. He talked about 
artificial (unnatural) and immoral gather of wealth 
(by commerce, usury, gamble).
For medieval economic thought the question of 
justice and usury was the key problem. Usury was 
the sin against justified price and the sin against 
nature. The greatest medieval clerical thinker To-
máš Akvinský questions: „Is the sin to get money 
for their lending, consequently take usurious inte-
rest?“ And presently he adds: „To gain usurious 
interest for lent money is by itself unfair because 
there is sold something that does not exist and 
thus there originates discrepancy which opposes 
to justice“ [1]. Usury was very closely connected 
with corruption. Fears of Church of usury leaded 
into concrete repressions which classified usury 
operation to three inadmissible profession (toge-
ther with prostitution and jugglery) for which were 
refused Christian privileges - the right to inhuma-
tion to christian land and the right to give charity 
(to clericals there menaced excommunication 
from Church). Usurers for the fear of damnation 
and God´s penalty „...bribed clergy to the highest 
degrees of clerical hierarchy“ [17]. Amorality of 
these corruption activities resulted to a certain 
degree from the fact that Akvinský apperceived 
money as a measure of value only in the case of 
realizable goods. According to his opinion money 
cannot serve as measure of things that are outsi-
de of economy (e. g. friendship, wisdom, human 
life, joy, love etc.), there cannot exist interpersonal 
exchange and thus even trade.
Fast progress and extension of monetary eco-
nomy during Middle Ages endangered old Chris-
tian values, however, on the other hand, the moral 
consecration of money as a mediator of exchange 
allowed to exchange money almost for anything. 
For money it was possible to buy clerical indulgen-
ce, funerals, weddings or christening, for money 
it was also possible to sell clerical dignities. Who 
had money also had a power and powerful man 
did not have to afraid of scarcity. Who had money 
did not have to afraid of the „Last judgement“ 
because he could redeem from evil and cry quits 
the God by different sacrifices and gifts. And by 
reason that the God was represented overland by 
the saints and Church, people made over these 
gifts to them. Expensive administration of clerical 
estates led to the implementing still new church 
charges. Introduce as matter of interest that bri-
bery by reason of „compliance“ already in medie-
val Bohemia was denoted by the following term 
- „oil one´s hand“. The oldest mention is limited 
on phrase „soil the clerical finger“ and this within 
the context of request for something that was the 
duty of priest from principle in itself. As well Hus-
site songs criticised prelates for the fact that they 
received bribes and they gave an example of wo-
man who in order to gain benediction from priest 
for her new-born child „... she gave beautiful can-
dle to priest, the thumb she greased“. Thus, the 
master Rokycana decried monks for the fact that 
they satisfied the request of believers only in the 
case of obtaining bribe: „When (...) thumb them 
believer grease, right they everything relieve“. 
These oldest documents made explained Czech 
linguist E. Michálek in the following way: Original-
ly it denoted the incidence by gift to priest to with 
a will does the ceremony of chrism (this ceremo-
ny priests did by thumb wetted in oil). When such 
bribe extended also to unclerical dignitaries, that 
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original connection with sanctification oil passed 
and the term - „oil one´s hand“ began to accept 
as instrumental term with the sense „ensure easy 
run“ [26].
At transition from clerical tenets to secular 
teaching there significantly contributed the eco-
nomic opinions of protestantism (especially 
Calvinists). Papers of Jan Kalvín (1509-1564), 
the representative of reformation in France, were 
not economic but theological, however, with pro-
gressive reformation his ideas leaked more and 
more to economic areas. The gist of his teaching 
was the absolute divine predetermination some 
people to „redemption“ and the others to „con-
demnation“. Believer does not know his destiny 
and that is why he can come by means of his 
earthy achievements among „desirable by God“. 
In this context he also dealt with connection of 
usury with antisocial behaviour: „Only very rarely 
it is possible to find in the world the usurer which 
is not at the same time extortionist addicted to un-
lawful and unfair profit“ [9]. Calvinism provided to 
aborning bourgeoisie religious and moral recour-
se. It urged each believer to raise in education, 
in employment, also raise economically, to rely 
on self powers and believe in divine cooperati-
on because only the achievers find approach to 
redemption. Economy, thrift, temperance, renun-
ciation of sensual pleasures and experiences, 
earthly ascetism became new virtues. Ideas, that 
protestantism proclaimed, were the protest aga-
inst sovereign power of the Catholic Church and 
helped to create entrepreneurial atmosphere and 
ethic of aborning capitalism. It is interesting that 
according to contemporaneous resources the ca-
tholic regions are much predisposed to corrupti-
on than protestant territories, it stands to reasons 
e. g. in comparison among catholic and protes-
tant cantons in Switzerland and federal countries 
of Germany. Also in Ireland the Catholic Church 
was, at the time when Irishmen lived within the 
scope of mainly protestant United Kingdom, the 
main bearer of Irisch resistance and self-help 
subculture which entailed the existence of grey 
economy and different „friendly helps“ in terms 
of „tit for tat“. To this mechanism the highest Irish 
clerical (catholic) agents were also involved.
Modern economic opinions (especially litera-
ture of mercantilists) have already stood on fixed 
pragmatic principles. They reflected financial and 
commercial interests of rulers, distinguished 
office-holders, businessmen and bankers. In the 
„regime of mercantilism“ most of positions 
held by office-holders was gained by purchase. 
Purchase of the government offices was at that 
time regarded as equally efficient investment (in 
term of needs of state) as purchase of production 
or business trade. About the year 1860 also offi-
cers of armycorps of previous British forces were 
appointed by similar principle. The duty was stay-
ed in every position at least one day, so that it was 
possible to buy the position of colonel, stay one 
day as colonel and after it sell this position and 
buy the position of captain etc. According to mer-
cantilists the wealth is money and so state power 
should have supported production of money. Ru-
ler gained money by means of taxation and loans 
of commercial bourgeoisie, but also in the way of 
administration of monopoly, the best well-know 
was export monopoly. Both businessmen and ru-
ler the monopoly ensured unimaginable profits in 
the form of taxation, thus, at the same time it also 
brought numerous corruption opportunities.
Mercantilism represented the system of exten-
sive economic regulation that was connected 
with corruption and we hardly find better example 
than France in period between the thirteenth and 
the eighteenth century. Just in France originated 
absolutist „mercantile system of corruption“ [4], 
in the sense that since the time of Charles VII. 
and Ceremony in the year 1439 whereat the king 
obtained sovereign power for taxation without the 
consent of people, and so there formed French 
„rent-seeking“ society for a term of three hundred 
years. Financial theorist of this period concisely 
describes this situation: „(...) the most important 
local farms were „hired“ to entrepreneurs who 
acquired the right to raise taxes in exchange for 
capitations. Amounts above these payments crea-
ted profits of these farmers and if they levied less 
than removal pays it was their loss no ruler´s loss. 
Corruption infiltrated enormous state bureaucra-
cy and became the part of common life. Property 
rights changed during centuries whereas taxed 
economy and other forms of „leases“ became 
hereditary. The sale of juridical and legal autho-
rities by the ruler became interesting examples 
of corruption“ [4]. Complete system of taxation 
and continuously more powerful royal exaction on 
local levels allowed and supported the system of 
open bribery which was administrated by institu-
tional aristocratic bureaucracy. The most capable 
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people were attracted to areas with the highest 
profit which in France meant that they tried to find 
profitable, bureaucratic office which could have 
been handed by means of heritable rights. Certa-
inty of absolute power and formation the system 
of assess taxes in France closely contrasted with 
uncertainty of revenues at private enterprise. 
American economist R.D.Tollison mentions that 
the character of this historical development in 
France is right explained on the basis of absence 
of „meaningful representative bodies“ or condi-
tions which could facilitate their progress. The 
model of business rent seeking in mercantile 
France was different than in England. English 
monarchs were not absolute in their authority of 
taxation, they were limited by the parliament that 
was established here already at the beginning 
of the fourteenth century. That is why the pro-
gress of English mercantile system was joined 
to number of conflicts between the king and the 
parliament and between the royal council and the 
council of general law. These conflits basically 
concerned who will drive and collect profits from 
English businessmen. That is why the efforts 
about regulation of monopolistic privileges in 
England were more expensive. For participants 
„...became too expensive by reasons of higher 
expenses connected with collective decision 
making in representative body, as the parliament 
was“ [9]. With falling the power of monarchy in 
England the movement towards representative 
democracy moved the position of rent-seeking 
activities to new environment. E. g. the price of 
lobby for monopolistic contrats was higher at 
elective representative than the price of lobby at 
the only monarchy. Finally, for rent seekers these 
transaction costs rised so much that they exce-
eded possible advantages. In consequence of 
that also government´s interventions in economy 
gradually declined and together with competitive 
judiciary evoked extensive uncertainty in liveness 
of any monopolistic society. With regard to these 
differences the government constitution in En-
gland was the tradition of corruptible system in 
mercantile France much stronger.
About forms and methods of intergrowing of 
state and economic sphere in mercantile France 
e.g. Lombard mentions: „(...) ambitious people 
of low-born became entrepreneurs without they 
stoped being king´s officers and this duality 
promoted them to creators of national unity, 
founders of long line specific for France. Jacques 
Coeur (...), helped to Charles VII. fill treasury, levy 
taxes and establish and check monopolies but he 
never neglected even his interests. He was not 
the only who cumulated different honours not 
even the one who lost them, but he first came 
in the legend about bureaucracy and corruption“ 
[18]. Mercantile interests markedly promoted 
corruption practices so that the financial power 
of certain entrepreneurs expressively increased, 
however, on the other hand, the system of pro-
tectionism, privileges and liberties did not make 
possible to insert acquired wealth anywhere and 
did not create the same opportunities for all. „(...) 
offices became dignities connected with public 
office which implies delegation of sovereign 
power. Their selling, cancelled only at the night 
of August 4th, 1789, enabled trafficing that had 
rising trend. State power, whose treasury was 
permanent empty, created new and new offices 
to make money by their purchase. Cardinal Riche-
lieu „...became the middleman in this profitable 
and inaccessible practice thereby he connected 
to frauds of public finance also abuse of power. 
(...) to could everything control, (...), he interfused 
own money with state finance and he established 
new form of criminality - nationalistic corruption, 
(...), his corruptibility did not undermine authority 
of the state but strengthened it“ [18].
The significant revenue of royal treasury and 
the resource of „other infamies“ [4] were also 
excise taxes and „taille“ - income taxes and real 
estate taxes of peasants, businessmen and crafts-
men who had not tax reliefs due to participation in 
royal productions. Implementation of these taxes 
had rough effects to allocation of inhabitants 
revenue and economic growth. Real revenues 
from excise tax grew between the year 1523 and 
the year 1641 eight times to ten times. Unlimited 
authority to impose taxes was divided between 
aristocracy and clergy who exploited this wealth 
for „performer consumption“. At the end of rule of 
Ludvík XIII. (between the year 1636 and the year 
1642) corruption had in France such proportions 
that French monarch collected three times even 
four times higher taxes from his liege people than 
Charles I. (Charles I. Stuart, English monarch 
1625 - 1649) who at that time fought with the par-
liament. Business author Georgy King estimated 
main resource of France in the year 1688 at L 
80,500,000 lbs while in England at L 41,700,00 
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lbs [4]. Robbing of state treasury, abuse of 
clerical positions and purchase of favours had 
during the prime of mercantilism copious amount 
of forms. Up to the present day they stay as evi-
dence of historic conditionality of corruption 
practices, at the same time they are eviden-
ce of their similarity across the history.
Similar situation dominated also in Czech pro-
fessional society in the period of its breakdown 
in the sixteenth-seventeenth century. Corruption 
between authorities and officials (aristocracy 
and intellectual bourgeoisie) represented ap-
proach to ensuring personal power and property 
advantages and gained control of power system 
at all levels. Between authorities and its officials 
(members of royal council, dignitaries, burgraves, 
regional marshals, fiscals, judges, scribes, typists 
and butlers) existed firm client links confirmed by 
the payment of salary, credit enterprise, adminis-
tration of gifts, mutual commerce and also irregu-
lar frauds of official money and corruption. It is 
interesting that the most of these frauds did not 
lead up to direct economic enrichment of officials 
but „in connection with corruption, constraint and 
different levels of patronage officials increased 
political influence between other classes by 
means of defalcation ...“ [7]. Next to political ca-
reer and progress to more prestigious positions 
naturally also development of own households 
was the sense of close personal and friendly con-
tacts, daily patronage and intervention in case of 
need. „In Czech state the numerous rank of lower 
aristocracy was totally dependent on nobility. On 
the contrary a number of aristocrats was retroac-
tively dependent on financially powerful knights 
who extended credit to them“ [7]. Next to aris-
tocracy also townsmen of rich royal towns, Jews, 
foreign businessmen and commercial, bank and 
entrepreneurial companies from abroad owned 
free monetary capital. Especially clerk service, 
that ensured to his bearer certain standard of 
living, led officials (very often before leaving from 
authority service) to operation of credit transacti-
ons. „Interest money ensured regular income that 
many times exceeded previous prepaid payments 
and ensured former official or his relatives appro-
ximately equal standard of living as in the period 
of active service. In this context it is necessary to 
take into consideration also enrichment of offici-
als by means of irregular revenues. The base of 
these irregular revenues were not only briberies 
but especially alienated officially money and their 
fraud“ [8]. Usurious profession was realized by 
loans where the rule stood on the edge of crash 
and where the flood of new money only removed 
self financial breakdown. Usurers invested perio-
dic flood of interest money back to interest opera-
tions, however, they had also naturally interest in 
acquirement of properties of those debtors who 
pledged their asset to them. It stands to reasons 
that financial crises often ended by breakdown, 
partial or total sale of assets into the hands of 
usurers.
 
2. Economic Ethic of Adam Smith 
Classical school of economics reflected in 
economic thinking the circumstances of ingoing 
capitalism and with it connected transition to 
machine large-scale production. The year 1776, 
when was for the first time issued the work of 
Adam Smith „An inquiry into nature and causes 
of the wealth of nations“, represents definitive 
origin of economics as independent discipline 
and Adam Smith becomes important personality 
of spiritual human history. Smith proved first of all 
economic risks of state interventions and limitati-
on of free enterprise. Then, significance of values 
as necessary parts of moral infrastructure of the 
market is key for him. Supporting ideas - idea 
of natural freedom and idea of fairness - Adam 
Smith transformed to economic thinking and 
connected with them also other principles which 
influence fluent functioning of market mechanism 
- competition, efficient achievement of property 
rights, economy, enterprise and creative thinking, 
creative and regular work.
We know that Smith constructed the system of 
natural freedom mainly in opposition on mercan-
tile doctrines. Just in polemic with mercantilism 
Adam Smith most emphasized that national eco-
nomy can not be effectively governed such as one 
large farm and it not even by the most intelligent 
statesman (he wrote about big French finance 
ministr - Colbert). According to Smith privileges 
of some people mean the limitation of the others, 
and if they are not recovered by special merit 
(e.g. patent) they mean the contravention of rule 
of fairness. It concerns about privileges of guilds, 
special subventions, duties or private monopo-
lies. His defence of „laissez faire“ was in token of 
defence of economic freedom and protestation 
against large government expenditures that he 
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treated as charge and brake of private initiative 
and economic growth: „...big nations never beco-
me poor by individual lavish and mismanage but 
by the state lavish and mismanage“ [24].
Smith´s economic liberalism brought humanity 
to a knowledge that the natural functioning of 
market system reposes on generally valid and 
respected moral ideas (devotion to contracts, 
payment morality, respect to market partner) 
and on certain institutional premises that are 
next to „laissez faire“ also institutions ensuring 
the justice. In case the state should properly 
accomplish its function and positively support 
economic efficiency in market economy, it should 
according to Smith dispose of trustworthy, right-
ful and impartial government. „Commerce, craft 
industry and manufactures can seldom prosper 
for a long time in the state where is not regular 
judiciary, where people are not sure of their pro-
perty, where the rule does not strengthen faith in 
contracts and where is not possible to depend 
on possibility that the state always intervenes its 
power to anyone debtor who can pay his debt 
also pays. Trade, craft industry and manufactures 
can seldom prosper in the state where is not 
sure the faith in justice of government“ [24]. The 
term „justice“ markedly included also protection 
of free competition before interest groups of 
makers: „...derogate someway interests this or 
that class only thereby to acquire other class evi-
dently opposses that justice and neutrality which 
is the ruler obliged to save in face of all his liege 
people“ [24].
In the „Wealth of nations“ Adam Smith puts 
mind to question of efficient tax administration. At 
the same time he adverts to signification of quality 
tax laws and trustworthy institutions for revenue 
collection „...chance that one avoids that taxes 
(intended as excise taxes) in the way of condtra-
band or other cheating of state treasury, it incures 
to offender often distrainment of his property and 
other penalties , (...) and it is generally man, (...) 
who would never be able to offend against the 
laws of real justice and if the laws of his country 
had not made as crime something that had never 
been the crime for nature, he would have been 
an excellent citizen. In countries with corrupted 
administration, that is at least generally suspec-
ted of that spends unnecessarily a lot of money 
and in the way that disposes with government 
revenues, it allows to gross incorrectnesses, the-
re are the laws protecting state treasury hold in 
minimal respect. Hardly anybody does remorses 
of that he cheated out state treasury if it is possi-
ble to realize that easily and without risk ...“ [24]. 
Within the context of questions of efficient duty 
and revenue collection we find at Smith´s work 
also warning relating to danger of briberies. An 
expensive tax administration demands the num-
ber of customs officers and tax collectors, their 
salaries and briberies present for inhabitants 
new tax that does not make for state treasury any 
additional revenue. Briberies of customs officers 
much exceed their salaries „...in some ports they 
amount more than double or triple of these sala-
ries“. Thus, Smith considers customs authorities 
as much more involved with bribery than other tax 
institutions. „Tax collectors of excise taxes obtain 
few briberies or no briberies, and because this 
element of tax collection was established much 
later it is not generally so corruptible as customs 
authorities to whom during long period of their 
duration brought and firm indurated a lot of vices 
in it“ [24].
Classical school of economics had been 
dominated in economic thinking to last third of 
the nineteenth century when it was replaced by
neo-classic economics - the spine of develo-
pment of standard line of economic thinking (in 
terms of line of mainstream of economic thinking 
and its text-book presentation). Outgoing from 
neo-classic paradigm the neo-classic theory be-
came to form as the science of microeconomic 
entities - households, firms and government, it 
became „mathematics of blisses and distresses“. 
This new conception of object of economics 
corresponded also with new methodology based 
on methodology individualism, marginal analysis 
and the conception of reasonable economic 
man „homo economicus“. Although Adam Smith 
accepted the signification of morality as „endoge-
nous“ factor important for function of economy, 
neo-classic economists apperceived ethic, mora-
lity, traditions and customs rather in „exogenous 
area“ of economic analyses. Purposeful, reaso-
nable decision making as selection mediate by 
the sense of man, in which blends together the 
present, the history and the future, was within 
„subjective revolution“ in last third of the ninete-
enth century replaced by formal analytic model 
which automatic behaviour a priori discharges. 
Thus, by presumption of exogenous given pre-
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ferences the neo-classic economics excluded 
one of the basic question relating to research of 
economic behaviour of entities in dynamic market 
environment - question how these preferences 
are created? „...consumer preferences separated 
from psychic behaviour, which them daily creates 
and modifies, turn in independent variable of the 
system in which is not place for planning and revi-
sion of plans“ [15]. R.Coase [10] e. g. perceives 
the success of standard economics in its theore-
tical power but the weakness of this system he 
derives from disregard for events in real world. 
This statement naturally relates to basic question 
pointing to conception of object and the purpose 
of economic theory.
3. Analysis of Corruption in Eco-
nomic Theories of the Twentieth 
Century
Economic theory of the twentieth century was 
characteristic by disputes about function of the 
state and coverage of its activities in society. 
After Great economic depression in the thirtieth 
and two world wars dominated in advanced eco-
nomies the tend to construction of centralized 
countries of wealth when the share of public 
sector on produced GDP in these countries 
markedly increased. In the environment of eco-
nomic theories the growth of state administration 
evoked reactions in form of activation of liberal 
ideas about function of modern market econo-
mies. There developed the negation of Keynes´s 
economic policy within the scope of trends and 
schools of anti-Keynes revolution. These trends 
in economic thinking also became the theoretical 
platform of economic-political experience of neo-
-conservative economic policy that put through 
especially in the United States of America and 
Great Britain. Economic programmes of notable 
politicians of both countries called as „Reagano-
mics“ and „Thatcherism“ identically performed 
in the interest of limitation of government econo-
mic interventions.
Thus, a number of significant economists of 
the twentieth century linked the problem of 
corruption firstly with growing range of sta-
te activities, as a result also in terms of general 
economics began to appear warning against 
opportunities of corruption and its dangerous 
results. The original piece of L. Mises and Ha-
yek´s crushing criticism of socialism - not only 
economic but also political, legal and social, no-
wadays pertain to classic liberal pieces declarati-
ve that the results of socialism or any other form 
of totalitarianism are same at any time: lack of fre-
edom, economic, political, law and moral decline. 
Murray Rothbard, continuing in Austria tradition 
of liberal thinking, pronounced an opinion that 
„...bribery is the result of position of certain pro-
duce branches out of law and that is why it helps 
to partly reduce loss of utility which government 
prohibition caused to consumers and produ-
cers“. According to Rothbard the bribery is „at 
given rate of government prohibitions (...) main in-
strument whereby happened to re-enforcement in 
the market. Bribery moves economy more closely 
to situation which would be achieved in free mar-
ket“ [23]. In his consideration about corruptibility 
of civil officers Rothbard finally reaches the diff-
erentiation between so-called aggressive bribes 
and so-called defensive bribes. Aggressive bribe 
leads to anchievement of exclusive licence that 
impedes to the others at activity in this field. This 
kind of bribery represents the payment for award 
of monopolistic privilege and represents marked 
movement from free market because the ones 
that cannot pay briberies are priced-out by their 
system. On the other hand, defensive bribe repre-
sents purchase of licence to operation of certain 
activity after it was declarated as unlawful. Defen-
sive bribe means movement towards free market. 
It is the price for providing service that means 
no exaction government orders from concrete 
person which pays the bribe. Rothbard compares 
these bribes to purchase of state licence and pre-
sumes that from economic aspect there is not any 
difference between them.
In the second half of the twentieth century the-
re engendered also liberal heritage of Chicago 
school. Its founder and leading figure Milton 
Friedman tirelessly defended the principles 
of economic liberalism and in his work he pati-
ently explained the reasons of inefficiency and 
wastage in economy with public funds that he 
not once connected with problems of corrup-
tion. In his preface to Czech publication of 
book „Capitalism and freedom“ from the year 
1993 Milton Friedman himself admits that on 
conditions of triumph of Keynes´s theory was 
his liberal opinions considered as absolutely 
extreme and that he and likewise considering 
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people were regarded as eccentric by mostly 
of his colleagues-intellectuals. In the book „Fre-
edom of choice“ [1980] together with his wife he 
brought out e. g. failure of social programmes in 
states of general prosperity: „If you spend your 
own money for yourself, you are very careful at 
decision making what you purchase for them (...) 
But when you spend external money for yourself, 
e.g. in form of refund of travelling expenses, you 
endeavour to acquire maximum satisfaction but 
you don´t care how much money you spend. The 
worst of all is when you spend external money for 
someone other. In this case you don´t care which 
way and how much money you spend and what 
you realize from. And exactly to this it happens 
in all governments“ [13]. According to Friedman 
has the attempt of people to redirect government 
spendings for yourself two key results. Many 
programmes tend to support rather middle and 
higher classes than lower and poor classes for 
which these programmes are created. The poor 
has not skills that are necessary to successful 
political struggle for money and that is why this 
class will be nearly always overpowered by clas-
ses that have better skills to have advantage from 
accessible opportunities. Second result is that 
net profit of receivers of transfer will be smaller 
than total redistributed money mass. According 
to Friedman in case that anyone has possibility 
take away to someone e. g. one hundred dollars, 
it pays off to spend to one hundred own dollars to 
obtain them. Money expended after constraint on 
lawmakers and ministerial posts, contributions to 
political campaigns and to other things are waste 
because they derogate tax-payer who pays while 
other gains. These resources must be deduct 
from gross transfers so that we get net profit. 
In case that officials spend money of tax-payers 
for foreign purposes, these expenses will be „... 
corrupt people which partake of redistributing. 
Next to waste of money, next to inability to attain 
proclaimed aims, the final result is decay of 
moral principles that hang together advanced 
society“ [13].
To problems of corruption expressed also G.S. 
Becker. Disclosure of corruption he apperceives 
as blessing in case that it leads to restriction of 
state impacts on economy. In the event that it has 
help only to politicians who promise in case of 
their election that they will be more hardworking 
than their predecessors, then experience shows 
that corruption appears soon again because it 
tends come back every time „...whenever any 
government acquires decisive impact on econo-
mic conditions“. According to Becker there exists 
only one way of reduction permanent influence 
of political process: weakening of connection 
between companies and politicians. „Danger of 
corruption is possible to reduce by election of ho-
nest politicians and punishment of enterprisers 
who unlawfully affect the policy. The simplest 
is clarify, standardize and mainly void needless 
rules regulating economic activity ...“ [3]. With 
above-mentioned totally corresponds also „The-
ory of economic regulation“[1971] - next repre-
sentative of Chicago school - George Stigler. 
On the basis of numerous empirical analyses of 
entrepreneurial conduct he came to the conclu-
sion that the regulation is not exogenous power 
serving economy as a whole but endogenous ef-
fect of economic processes (e. g. fight of interest 
groups). It is also impossible to ignore that in the 
field of microeconomic analysis appeared just in 
the scene of Chicago school during the twentieth 
century tends to make clear unlawful (so also 
corruption) forms of behaviour by means of the 
theory of reasonable economic choice. With 
reference to application areas of Gary S. Becker 
in this context it talks about „economic imperia-
lism“and about G.S.Becker as about „economic 
imperator“. In the context of object of our interest 
there is key Becker´s application of standard mic-
roeconomic analysis to problems of crime.
With open incorporation of problems of corrup-
tion we meet in economic theory till with arrival of 
the theory of public choice in half of the twentieth 
century. This theory interpreted corruption as 
a result of growing meaning of the state in market 
economies, connected with experience of „welfa-
re state“. Increased interest of economists about 
corruption and its economic aspects stimulated 
also, especially in last quarter of the twentieth 
century, numerous empirical researches focused 
on results of corruption in world economies. In 
this period there began to occur also first scien-
tific empirical studies and economic analyses 
focused on problems of economic dimensions of 
corruption, possibilities of its exact assumption, 
contexture of corruption and economic effici-
ency of states, economic growth, foreign trade, 
investments and others. After the fall of socialis-
tic regimes in states of late East European block 
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this process further intensified. It appeared that 
countries ingoing the way of economic transfor-
mation of their economy from centrally planned 
economies to market economies have no small 
problems with corruption that in itself makes 
serious barrier originating market relations and 
new democratic regimes. It is possible to tell that 
wider intellectual rear in theoretic level these ten-
dencies find in equally fast evolving theory of new 
institutional economics. Thus, it stands to reason 
that analysis of corruption in environment of eco-
nomic theories of the twentieth century is exactly 
connected with origin and development of these 
two economic trends.
4. Corruption in the Theory of Pub-
lic Choice
Public Choice became in passed decades one 
of the most productive branches of general eco-
nomic theory. To its dynamic development contri-
buted both circumstances linked with economic-
-political practice and circumstances connected 
with development of economic theory in itself. In 
the level of economic practice it was especially 
Great economic depression of the thirties of the 
twentieth century. As it was noted above, as a re-
sult of this crisis there arised serious fears and 
anxiety over possible limits of functioning of the 
market and began to form a number of notions 
which way the state could replace price system 
and allocate goods and services likewise effici-
ently (or even better) as the market. In the half of 
the twentieth century these notions became to 
realize in practice in all advanced economies and 
it primarily by means of the growth of extent of pu-
blic sector. James Buchanan, the founder of the 
theory of public choice in this connection holds 
an opinion that„...all states spend much more 
resources then it is possible to vindicate with any 
lawful arguments, (...) tell that 15% of total pro-
duct is suitable to collect for collective agencies, 
(...), but even west democratic states commonly 
spend between 35 to 60% of product, then three 
to five times as many. The biggest countries of 
west Europe spend about 50% of gross domestic 
product, The United States of America spend 
40% [5]. In the theoretical sphere one of the most 
important motive of birth of the theory of public 
choice became the necessity to respond to thesis 
about market failure which pronounced the neo-
-classic welfare economy in the first half of the 
twentieth century. However, also at the beginning 
of the third millenium the market failure still rema-
ins powerful integral thesis which contemporary 
economists and politicians scientific argue on 
behalf of government market regulations.
Approach of the theory of public choice re-
presents within economic theories „economic 
analysis of policy“. This analysis takes advantage 
of methodology of general economic science 
and it considers decision making of politicians 
and their electors as a part of wider model of eco-
nomic reasonable behavior. Then, on this basis it 
explains behavior of political entities (politicians, 
civil officers, electors) on so-called political 
market. Politicians deal with needs of society, 
protect public interest, naturally only by reasons 
of „disguise“ their real aim that is satisfying of in-
dividual interests, following of own interests and 
exploitation of their position to own benefit. Thus, 
received political proceedings generally produce 
short-term benefit based on long-term costs. 
In its theories the school of public choice 
focused on interpretation of key elements of 
modern mixed economies. E. g. interest groups 
(corporations, professional bodies, associations 
and unions) which can affect an efficient run of 
economy if they obtain large advantages becau-
se of their organization. American economists 
Mancur Olson in this context deduced that in 
case that the number of interest groups, their 
power and political authority increase, it leads 
to extension of redistributed process in society. 
Thereby it happens to limitation of economic 
efficiency which has negative impact on value 
of produced national income. Thus, social costs 
form in the process of income redistributing 
from unorganized groups to organized interest 
groups. In economic term activities of interest 
groups represent net costs because by enforce-
ment of partial interests is engaged a number of 
people whose activity could be productively used 
otherwhere. However, in the field of theory of 
regulation this school demonstrated that many 
companies consider the regulation as positive 
phenomenon because it protects them against 
risks of competition and that different lobby even 
urge for ensuring of regulation.
In the area of public administration the scho-
ol of public choice holds an opinion that also 
official urges for maximization of his profit. „The 
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bureaucrat tries to maximalize his utility in terms 
of restrictions which he faces. In this respect he 
does not differentiate from anyone. It may with dif-
ficulty expects him to will support some vaguely 
defined „public interest“ if it is not in accordance 
with his own interest“ [6]. It can signify by recei-
ving briberies, tendency to maximalize of natural 
advantages in terms of income, increase of presti-
ge or power. Common instrument for achievement 
of these aims is raising the number of state offi-
ces and tendency to maximization of their budget 
at the expense of taxpayers. It concerns about 
the question of bureaucratic competition. Every 
office searches for approach how to increase 
demand for its outputs at same small number of 
customers and same legislature and it conduces 
in consequence to increase of budget subsidies. 
However, it is not possible to every office increa-
ses its budget at the same time and evenly. The 
growth in share of office A on total budget leads 
to decrease in share of office B, ceteris paribus. 
William Niskanen adds to this that higher posted 
officials responsible for office budget dispose of 
certain spirit of enterprise. That is why the utility 
function of bureaucrat includes also permanent 
income, possibility of subsidiary income, authori-
ty and power, social position and facility of ope-
rating the office. Because of all these „variables“ 
are dependent on office budget, it is possible 
on this conditions to consider the size of office 
budget as relevant instrument of maximization of 
bureaucrat´s usefulness. Gordon Tullock moreo-
ver mentions that salaries of bureaucrats depend 
on number of subordinace officers. In case that 
bureaucrats are not the lowest elements in all 
hierarchy of public administration, the growth of 
employment rate will be grow together with their 
salaries because (1) total demand for work is 
higher and (2) late subordinate officers will beco-
me new managers.
In accordance with the school of public choice 
the government posts have in political (eventually 
bureaucratic) market monopoly position in the fi-
eld of their activities, and in the world with high re-
gulation economic market and market allocation 
is replaced by political market and by allocation 
based on nonmarket decision making of politi-
cal or bureaucratic monopolists. As a result of 
growth of extent, power and competences of the 
state it is achieved the enterprise gains ever more 
often as effect of different government subsidies, 
taxes and regulations than as effect of spirit of 
enterprise and enterprise skills. „Enterprise dis-
covery“ (the term used by Austria economists 
Israel Kirzner) fulfils in the way of influence of 
political resolutions, lobbyism and corruption for 
acquirement of goodwill of offices or gain public 
orders. Economic fruitfulness of the company 
also often depends on it whether company gains 
subsidies, whether manages to increase import 
duties, if the competition is limited or if safety or 
ecological rules are deduced. State as economic 
entity ever more pursues its own interests and 
economic entities are ever more learning to ex-
ploit the state for enforcement of their interests. 
These tendencies, when the economic behaviour 
moves from economic market to political market, 
the school of public choice calls rent seeking. 
Generally this activity means to exploit political 
process to enrichment at the expense of others. 
According as Buchanan [4] mentions it concerns 
about specific term, nevertheless, it expresses 
the way of behaviour which „...as it seems was 
always with us and it is impropable that some-
times disappears. (...) Rent seeking became 
more important because institutional changes 
disclosed opportunities that did not exist in the 
nineteenth century and at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. (...) What is rent seeking? (...) 
we propose to use this term to description of be-
haviour in that institutional form when individual 
effort towards maximization of values creates 
social loss rather than social surplus“. Bribes 
pose the part of rent seeking activities. 
Relevant height of bribe is entered in bargaining 
strategy. The entity who corrupts is enterpriser 
(so-called political enterpriser), the entity who 
is corrupted is politician or civil officer. Political 
enterpriser seeking the rent is ready to bear high 
costs to gain advantage whereof the rent flows. 
It concerns about profit that he did not acquire 
in competitive environment or acquire only with 
expenditure of much bigger effort and resources. 
By reason that the competition is transferred from 
economic market to political market, competition 
between rent conquerors (seekers) increases 
costs on its obtaining. These costs include costs 
of rent conquerors (seekers) (to contacting poli-
ticians and officials, to lobbyism, to bribery and 
often also costs linked with crime, e.g. organized 
gangs for elimination of potential competition), 
costs caused by ineffective work of officials who 
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let to corrupt this way and costs pressing on third 
side, especially on taxpayers. The share of one 
citizen on so waste resources is relatively low, 
hardly numerable and citizen generally the fall of 
his standard of living practically does not register. 
However, in a long period the redistribution of 
wealth in society is very evident. Rent seeking 
is also connected with basic economic principle 
- principle of scarceness. The scarcer and more 
profitable rent (net profit), the more expensive. 
This fact affects also mutual expectations of par-
ties concerned, so those who gain and those who 
decide about award of privilege. The scarceness 
increases expectation, higher expectations incre-
ase the „price“ of rent. 
Following graph (Figure 1a: Market impact of 
licence) represents the adverse effect of exis-
tence of licence (eventually quotas) on certain 
market. In case that this market would not be 
regulated there would form equilibrium price P
E 
corresponding with equilibrium quantity of pro-
vided service Q
E
. However, on the assumption 
that for providing of this service is necessitated 
the licence whose amount is delimited e.g. at 
the level Q
L
, primarily growing supply changes 
into vertical line. It results in existence of higher 
prices on market (at the level P
L
). Every licensee 
will be presently realize net economic profit im-
plicit in limited number of these licences. Grey 
area on the graph demonstrates total economic 
profit of providers of this service. It is possible 
that licensees realize their net profits by gaining 
(seeking) on political market. Then, it is more sui-
table to use for these net revenues the term - rent 
(the difference between price achieved on market 
because of seeking rent P
L
 and potential market 
price which would be achieved in case that ap-
propriate enterpriser does not seek the rent, e.g. 
at the level P
B
). The triangle ABE, evident from the 
graph, measures market inefficiency caused by 
award of licences. It poses „dead loss“ of unused 
market opportunities of demanded consumers 
and offering providers of services.
On second graph (Figure 1b: Net economic 
rent) is illustrated the situation leading to achie-
vement so-called net economic rent. It concerns 
about revenue, eventually payment to owner of 
certain scarce resource whose supply is totally 
non-elastic. The price of this resource and net 
revenue of owner is claused only by the height of 
demand. In the context of the theory of rent see-
king it is possible to illustrate with utilize this gra-
ph e.g. net income of corruptible civil officer, in 
spite of the fact that he is not owner he disposes 
exclusive power to take decision about allocation 
this scarce resource. In case that Q is e.g. exclu-
Fig. 1: Market impact of licence and net economic rent
Fig. 1a: Market impact of licence Fig. 1b: Net economic rent
Source: own adaptation
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sive right to import of certain commodity from 
given foreign destination then P means possible 
price of this right (i.e. how much the possible rent 
seekers will be willing to pay for this right). If this 
right is the object of rent seeking activity, rent 
seekers will compete by the height of „price“. 
The right falls to one who offers the most (on 
the graph - demand d
3
). Gray area illustrating net 
economic rent falls to corruptible officer. Thus, in 
similar situation the height of bribe creates the 
interval whereof the price of this nonmarket good 
or service moves.
Rent seeking on political market makes in every 
economy undesirable phenomenon. If human 
and material resources expended on lobbyism, 
creating contacts with politicians and officials 
and etc., were used otherwhere, they could cre-
ate useful goods and services. In reality activities 
of rent seeking are not only matter of relationship 
between enterprisers and politicians. As officials 
try to enlarge their influence and extend their of-
fices, it comes to rent seeking also within public 
sector. Primary resource of inefficiency, on condi-
tion of given organization of institutions, consists 
according to the school of public choice in accor-
dance with organization of government rights of 
realization of revenues. Then, to rent seeking of 
single offices we can regard as internal effort to 
assign distribution of these rights. Because there 
is not exist any objective government to distribute 
these rights, spendings on rent seeking will be 
unavoidable.
Gordon Tullock describes also other form of 
rent seeking: among enterprisers and business-
men exist a lot of those who avoid to rent seeking 
activities. These are people with natural business 
abilities and their „arts“ they achieve to exploit in 
business transactions at the most. To avoid the 
growth of costs in rent seeking activities they 
utilize their private knowledges and patronage 
as „protective shield“ against bribes. The func-
tion of second interested side (high civil officer, 
government representative) is „only“ assert his 
influence. About gained revenue, which may have 
financial or other form, the parties concerned 
divide. „That is what I denote as activity of rent 
avoidance and it is main resource of ineffici-
ency in rent seeking economies“ [4]. Thus, rent 
avoidance proceeds as converse rent seeking 
activity because it comes to realization of incom-
petent advantages on the side of politician or 
official. Also in this form of corruption costs are 
transferred on the rest of society and so they slow 
the growth of this economy. According to Tullock 
it is possible that under present circumstances in 
the United States of America, but also in most of 
west European countries, rent seeking activities 
have much lower significance than rent avoidan-
ce activities. However, Tullock doubts „..., that it 
will be true in the future“. 
Public choice offered serious arguments aga-
inst ready growth of size of public sector and 
enforcement of still bigger budget revenues 
„necessary“ to financing of projects whose effici-
ency gradually declines. It referred also to serious 
internal problems of democratic political process 
which are according to Buchanan especially un-
successful check on government, politicians, bu-
reaucracy and state. Buchanan tries to find soluti-
on in rules that means self-limitation of individual 
but in his own long-term interest. „It is possible to 
reform social systems only by means of system 
changes in rules of game. (...) I put the accent on 
key meaning of rules which would derogate the 
execution of state power and their embodiment 
in constitution“ [6]. Inquiry of possibilities of in-
stitutional check on government, politicians and 
state on the basis of rules and their enforcement 
by law and by moral codex, belongs according to 
Buchanan to key problems of constitution econo-
mics. Because the majority vote does not create 
sufficient guarantee of efficiency of public sector, 
he advises the system of unanimous vote, espe-
cially in case when the result of voting affects 
the laws of citizens. According to our opinion 
the large credit of economists of public choice 
is that on the field of economic theory disclosed 
problems which affect by now traditional look on 
behaviour of politicians and state and thus disclo-
sed opportunity for adequate economic analysis 
of phenomena which were for a long period 
domain of polimetricians but that still more often 
deform real economic environment.
5. Corruption in the Perspective of 
New Institutional Economics
„Corruption has two stepmothers - human 
smallness and ineffective institutions. This reality 
already Montesquieu perceived: There exists two 
kinds of corruption. The one when people does 
not observe laws and the other when laws corrupt 
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people. It is confirmed illness because it consists 
in medicine in itself“ [18].
Though, institutionalism as the trend of eco-
nomic theory has its roots in works of American 
institutionalists in the first half of the twentieth 
century, dynamic development of this branch of 
economic thinking we can notice since the sixties 
of the twentieth century. In this context econo-
mists talk about new institutional economics 
(eventually about neo-institutionalism). This 
term is ascribed to Oliver Williamson which pur-
posed to distinguish „new theories“ from primary 
American institutionalism of „old institutionalists“. 
However, there exists also opinion that new insti-
tutional economics became independent trend 
of though since publication the paper of Ronald 
Coase „Merit of the firm“ in the year 1937 when 
transaction costs were instituted to economic 
analysis. Czech economist Karel Kouba earmarks 
new institutional economics as one of trends of 
general economics that developed „...in discussi-
on about unsatisfactory characteristic of traditio-
nal mainstream analysis in the sixties...“ [14].
In theoretical level the neo-institutional econo-
mics responded to absence of institutional fra-
mework in neo-classic economics „...at analysis 
of economic efficiency in time there were accep-
ted two mistaken premises: firstly that institutions 
are not significant and secondly that time is not 
significant“ [25]. Though, contrary of the „old“ 
American institutionalists the neo-institutionalists 
modified traditional neo-classic economics in the 
way of completion its analytic framework about 
function of institutions because according to new 
institutionalists „...institutions play fundamental 
role at formation of economic behaviour of peo-
ple and at gaining of certain economic efficiency, 
(...), institutions change in time and many times 
respond to activity of economic factors“ [25]. 
In institutional world the contractual man maxi-
malizes his usefulness within given institutional 
settlement. He disposes of limited racionality, 
exists in the world of transaction costs, property 
rights and definite, time asymmetric information. 
To can decide in this environment, there must be 
created certain rules. These rules are accepted 
as a part of culture. Contractual man may ma-
ximalize his wealth also at the expense of the 
others (e.g. tricks, cheating etc.) which constitu-
tes meaningful problem in the world of definite 
information and limited racionality because it is 
not possible to recognize dishonest individual in 
advance.
In economical-political sphere the interest 
about institutional characteristics appeared 
early the nineties of the last century and it was 
connected especially with questions of economic 
efficiency of states. Then, increased interest 
about the role of institutions raised the process 
of transformation of central planned economies. 
Empiric analyses and research in this field be-
gan to orientate on identification of differences 
in economic efficiency between countries or 
groups of countries just on the basis of institu-
tional factors. „Rise and fall of Soviet Union and 
world communism we are not able to clarify by 
means of neo-classic analysis instruments. To 
solution of present problems of development we 
ought to approach by means of institutional and 
cognitive approach . (...) new political economics 
was especially focused on the United States of 
America and developed societies. Acute chal-
lenge of research is patterned third world and 
communities in eastern Europe“[21]. In this area 
new institutional economics inquiry for alternative 
sets of social rules (institutions, property rights) 
and economic organizations affecting behaviour 
of people, allocation of resources and economic 
equilibrium.
New institutional economics does not create 
homogenous intellectual trend. In accordance 
with the conception of organizations and institu-
tions with which works and according as repre-
sentatives of individual approaches complement 
and modify traditional neo-classic economics, 
there was differentiated some trends in new in-
stitutional economics (near to this e.g. Icelandic 
economist Thráinn Eggertsson In Economic Be-
havior and Institutions, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). We assume that within 
the context of interpretation of corruption pro-
blem it seems as efficient an approach developed 
especially by D. C. North which works with eco-
nomic and political rules and with institutions as 
endogenous factors and as unifying component 
he implements there transaction costs. Further, 
it is necessary to remark that at the present time 
there already exists in new institutional econo-
mics a large-scale literature which applied its 
theoretical conceptions to interpretation whole 
extent of problems of economic and extraeco-
nomic phenomena. In this spectra there appears 
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in the period of passed ten-twenty years also 
applications of microeconomic analyses that are 
directly focused on problems of corruption and 
bribery (it is especially concerned on applications 
in terms of institutional conception of theory of 
the firm and so-called theory of principal-agent 
(theory of agency).
Within the context of above-mentioned facts 
we comprehend institutions in accordance with 
definition of D.C.North: Institutions are „the ru-
les of game in society (...), limitations designed 
by people, limitations which affecting human 
relations“ [22]. These are limitations, „...which 
people impose on themselves“ [22]. Institutions 
like these may be:
⇒ Formal - they have legal form. It is concer-
ned about whole legal framework of economy 
which regulates economic behaviour of people. 
The impact of formal institutions on efficiency of 
economic entities is mediated but considerable.
⇒ Informal - steady customs, traditions, ha-
bits, taboos, rules of conduct, construction of 
social systems (e.g. on family or relational base), 
everything what we called as „culture“of this soci-
ety. Informal limitations may be [22]:
•  extension and modification of formal rules, 
•  socially punishable standard of behaviour,
•  internally exact rules of behaviour.
Thus, institutions represent the set of formal 
and informal political, economic and social rules 
(including their exaction). In case that instituti-
ons choose between behaviour that is allowed 
and that is disallowed, they effect on mind and 
behaviour of economic entities, participate in 
formation of their preferences and expectations 
and thus make certain behaviour predictable 
and given environment steadier. In term of our 
interest it is fundamental that institutions 
should be so quality to enable relatively 
equal access to economic resources for 
economic entities and at the same time 
they should be capable to create mecha-
nisms prevent from different frauds against 
competitive conduct and moral hazard. 
These requirements are necessary because the 
quality of institutions partakes of assessment the 
level of competition and together with standard 
economic limitations and used technologies af-
fects production and transaction costs and the-
reby also profitability and workability of different 
economic activities.
„In case that institutions represent rules of 
game, organizations and enterprisers are pla-
yers“ [21]. Organizations „...originate as a result 
of opportunities that are provided by institutional 
framework. In case that institutional framework 
makes piracy profitable then begin to form piracy 
organizations, in case that it makes efficient ac-
tivity profitable then originate organizations-firms 
that are engaged in productive activities“ [21]. 
North [22] defines organizations as „...intercon-
nected groups of participants acting under the 
pressure of some institutions“. These are groups 
of individuals, hierarchic structures which rising 
on the basis of certain institutions, function on 
their basis or make for their exaction. Organiza-
tions should be economic, political, social and 
educational.
In market environment, where organizations 
and institutions interact, changes take place. 
According to institutionalists it concerns about 
continual progressive process which is the 
result of desicion making of individuals in orga-
nizations. The majority of these resolutions is 
stationary, proceeds as rutine in terms of habit 
or convention so that it corresponds to expec-
ted model of behaviour of individuals. However, 
some resolutions exceed the frontier of expected 
behaviour, gradually lead to change of relations 
between individuals and organizations and con-
sequently also to change of formal and informal 
rules. The necessity of change of institutions in 
many cases results from that they become a re-
striction at raising living standard of inhabitants 
(e. g. in conception of T. Veblen institutions often 
irrationable restrict and wrong orientate creative 
activities of entities). Thus, it is concerned about 
very wide problems that is connected with the 
question of institutional change. According to 
North there exists two basic resources of insti-
tutional changes: change of relative prices and 
change of preference. Change of formal instituti-
ons, e.g. change of rules of allocation mechanism 
is relatively easy and fast. On the other hand, in 
case of informal institutions it is necessary to 
plan for longer period. Change of informal limi-
tations is more progressive and subconscious 
because it relates to development of alternative 
models of behaviour consistent with newly per-
ceived advantages and costs. Dependence of 
institutions in given country and time on historic 
development of its institutional form founds the 
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„path dependency“. Even despite of change of 
formal institutions informal institutions stay for 
a long period unchanged so that there rises 
certain stress between informal limitations and 
new formal rules. Change of institutions means 
also the change of existing organizations and/
or the formation of new organizations which in 
interaction with institutions promote institutional 
changes. Key role there represents competition 
which urges organizations to invest to perspecti-
ve knowledges and acquirements whose chara-
cter the institutional environment retroactively 
determines. North deduces that in the process 
ineffective institutions will pass and gradually it 
will come to rise of effective forms of economic, 
political and social organizations. Basic long-term 
resource of changes of institutions in time is the 
process of learning which leads to changes of 
mistaken models of behaviour, determines rate 
of changes of institutions and depends on rate of 
competition between organizations.
From above-mentioned results that for achieve-
ment of efficient function of market it is necessary 
to individual participants know right methods of 
achievement of their aims. It is concerned about 
right estimation of behaviour of other players and 
in the case of false presumption promptly exploit 
informative feedback. The ones that correct their 
primarily false models have a chance to survive in 
competition but the ones that do not adapt will be 
excluded from the market. Thus, market efficiency 
means that the structure of market institutions will 
not advantage anybody a priori. However, North 
refers to the fact that „(...) institutions or formal 
rules at least are created so that they serve to 
interests of those that have sufficient bargaining 
power to create new rules“ [21]. Thus, it leads to 
raising of transaction costs for other participants. 
Individuals behave on the basis of asymmetric 
informations and wrong models of behaviour 
derived from their limited rationality. Informative 
feedback is imperfect and does not lead to cor-
rection of erroneous decisions. Market functions 
inefficiently and there survive only the ones that 
have access to information and/or the ones for 
which institutions were created so that just their 
models of behaviour were vital.
As above-mentioned in institutional economics 
it is concerned at the present time about interpre-
tation of impact of institutions or institutio-
nal factors on total economic efficiency of 
given country. Basal premise of institutionalism 
is following: provided that in society are created 
and maintained suitable political and economic 
institutions, they can positively affect economic 
efficiency of a country and in the long term incre-
ase their competitive advantage. Differences in 
economic institutions are consider as one of the 
front reason of different rates of economic grow-
th in several countries. However, their efficiency 
strongly depends on political institutions. That is 
why in practically application level the quality of 
institutional environment of individual countries, 
eventually their groups, is viewed at the present 
time, and it both in totally level and in the level of 
partial components of formal and informal insti-
tutions. In this line it is possible to deduce that 
especially analysis of informal institutions begin 
to open not only wide spectrum of problems with 
which contemporary economies on different le-
vels of their economic development wrestle but 
also a number of questions, tasks and challenges 
for next generations. Prof. Mlčoch in this context 
talks about act of „law of diminishing marginal 
efficiency of law enforcement“ [19]. Though, 
the problems of corruption, as way of behaviour 
of economic players, represents in this wide 
spectrum of moral dimension of economy, habits, 
traditions and conventions only certain subset, 
existing theoretical and empiric studies enough 
illustrate negative impacts of corruption on eco-
nomic efficiency of states and at the same time 
they warn against hysteresis of this phenomenon 
in contemporary economies.
In the view of new institutional economics 
we can define corruption behaviour as 
departure from formal rules. In the sphere 
(country) where corruption is strongly ro-
oted by habit or tradition, this method of 
behaviour belongs to wide system of unethi-
cal informal institutions. Corruption is not si-
tuated „outside of“ economic system but in case 
it exists then it exists as endogenous institution 
and it represents independent system with own 
culture and tradition. Corruption „...functions as 
social system, has its own rules of game, internal 
mechanisms of its development that affecting its 
power, pungency and the rate of spread in socie-
ty“ [12]. It declines efficiency of fighting with cor-
ruption of course. E.g. experiments, that were led 
for purpose of elimination of corruption in the way 
of personal exchange of corrupt people, failed 
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and proved as highly ineffective. When we induct 
new, „fair“ people (players) to same unchanged 
conditions (institutions), they will behave very fast 
the same way as their predecessors or they will 
leave this position.
Corruption standards, rules and relations 
of mutual confidence are a part of corruption, 
without their observance corruption would not 
be possible (it is necessary to know right peo-
ple on right place). These corruption rules and 
standards find their position especially where 
exist „white places“ as failures at the system of 
formal institutional form. According to sociologic 
literature, e.g. [11], it comes to failures of official 
normative system of society (so-called social dis-
organization) in three basic forms:
⇒ In society (or in some of its area) there exists 
a number of contradictory rules when it is not 
enough evident to participants which rule they 
should prefer. Tends to corruption behaviour re-
sult from findings that just this behaviour admits 
the biggest profit to them.
⇒ Observance of official norms does not lead 
to relevant effects or premium.
⇒ Situation when official rules are totally 
missing. This situation is characteristic e.g for 
transformation period of post-communist coun-
tries where old standards are not valid and new 
standards are not created up to now.
Thus, the failure of formal institutions discloses 
the scope for spread of corruption standards 
as informal institutions. However, on the part of 
participant players it concerns about reasonable 
reaction on reality of the system because exis-
tent (eventually nonexistent) institutions don´t 
represent motivation factor for players so that 
corruption behaviour appears in this situation as 
economically reasonable. Seeing that corruption 
has its own rules, corruption institutions and for-
mal institutions compete. Finally, corruption can 
substitute the function of formal institutions (e.g. 
the situation of poor countries of third world or 
the period of real socialism when different pre-
servered interpersonal links decline uncertainty 
of inefficient markets). At repeated corruption 
actions corruption standards are moreover re-
produced and they take control of the system. 
They gradually leak in public where shed corrup-
tion environment, as the set of collective notions, 
eventually culture models that exploitation of 
public authorities, giving and taking bribes do 
common and customary excusable act for inha-
bitants of given country“ [12]. Thus, corruption 
environment contributes to establish corruption 
transaction as lawful method of behaviour. To 
stabilization elements of corruption system it is 
necessary to add also detected and published 
corruption affairs of top public representatives 
(or also personalities in the media, top sportsmen 
etc.) and also existence of long term open and 
still unpunished corruption causes. To stability of 
corruption system also formalization of corrup-
tion facilitates. Formalization of informal corrupti-
on rules the participant players can achieve e.g. 
lobbyism (e.g. for enforcement of restriction of 
corruption on certain market or for enforcement 
of soft anti-corruption legislation etc.) To this con-
duces especially the client system. These facts 
on the one hand stabilize and strengthen existent 
corruption system, on the other hand they change 
expectations of entities about behaviour of their 
opponents and thereby they change corruption 
system. The result of this will be raising of the 
equilibrium level of corruption in the following 
period and the growth of transaction costs.
Corruption, whether as casual form of ignore of 
engagement with state and law, or as substitute 
system of formal institutions, takes effects un-
lawfully in secret form. However, in term of long 
period it embodies high constancy linked with 
the system of informal social links (patronage, 
push, nepotism) and then necessary institutio-
nal change is struggled very hard. „...Marginal 
changes can bring to solution that - as soon as 
they predominate (...) they are lock-in, and then 
lead to certain specific way to future“ [20]. The 
power of late dependence, the power of the fact 
that corruption institutions which the society inhe-
rited, are able to survive, is considerable. In this 
context it is necessary to mention the situation in 
new market economies, as the Czech economy. 
Exactly in the area of corruption it is possible 
to pursue the path dependence. Though, formal 
rules and social standards exist more than fifteen 
years corruption founds new forms, enforcement 
of formal rules is inconsistent, rules are not ad-
hered and/or they are neglected. Then, created 
institutions naturally cannot execute the purpose 
which ought to execute and economy cannot 
function after the model of advanced democratic 
economies. It stands to reason why the level of 
corruption and corruption perception in econo-
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mies of late Soviet Union The report of World 
Bank from the year 2002 designated as one of 
five key circumstances that should explain why 
well operating institutions in developed market 
economies do not have to lead to same results in 
these countries and countries of third world. Also 
Czech institutionalist prof. Mlčoch in the long 
term makes noises about problems of „replication 
of institutions“. According to him the moral decli-
ne as necessary product of totalitarian regime did 
not stop but it continues. To this contributes sys-
tematically displacement of ethic standards out of 
economy. „For our backwardness is - told with Ar-
row - responsible loss of mutual confidence. And 
for loss of mutual confidence everyone bears the 
responsibility in such rate in which he conceded 
and tolerated non-competitive function of political 
markets in years of transformation“ [19].
Conclusion
Submitted paper put a question whether in the 
development of economic thinking exists histori-
cally conditioned, theoretic reflexion of problems 
of corruption and whether, eventually in what way 
economists of different periods and different 
economic trends analysed corruption relations 
existing in economic reality and how they inter-
preted them. This historic excurcus we undertook 
with awareness of impossibility of total complexi-
ty, nevertheless, our endeavour was to noted the 
reflection of problems of corruption in the context 
of historically changing social-economic conditi-
ons and their reflection in the history of economic 
thinking as well as also in the context of paradigm 
changes of economic theory in itself.
Analysis led across the historic development 
of economic thinking brought us to a conclusion 
that the attention of economists did not put 
a questions of corruption as object of its 
interest. Problems of corruption behaviour 
was not until the half of the twentieth cen-
tury perceived as economic problem. At the 
same time we documented that in works of many 
front economists the problems of corruption was 
not totally ignored. In their works we find moral 
denouncement of all who would urge for self 
enrichment at the expense of the others and war-
ning against the corruption of power. Within this 
context, also „Wealth of nations“ stays for more 
than two centuries still actual and wise spring for 
all who tries to find the way not only to economic 
but also to ethic way of behaviour in economic 
environment. Further, we can claim that althou-
ght the neo-classic economics assigned ethic, 
morality, traditions and habits to „exogenous 
environment“ of economic analyses, the modifi-
cation of original neo-classic paradigm enabled 
to economists of Chicago school at the end of 
the twentieth century to apply standard economic 
analysis to a number of forms of extraeconomic 
activities. To this area belongs also Becker´s the-
oretic analysis of crime in whose framework it is 
possible to research also the problems of corrup-
tion as reasonable choice of individual. During 
the twentieth century a number of economists 
connected the problem of corruption especially 
with growing spread of state activities associated 
with building so called welfare states. However, 
with open incorporation of problems of corrupti-
on we meet as far as with the origin of the theory 
of public choice in the half of the twentieth cen-
tury. In many theories of public choice corruption 
behaviour is analysed in connection with public 
administration and policy but also in connection 
with behaviour of enterprisers who in economic 
environment (with growing state participation) 
move their enterprise activities from economic 
market to political market. Methodology appro-
ach of new institutional economics enabled to 
take problem of corruption in much wider dimen-
sion of real economic structures and relations 
and opened in front of wide scientific community 
also perspective field for empiric and theoretical 
research of growth efficiency of countries. Analy-
sis of economic effects of corruption represents 
in this field inconsiderable place.
We supposed that the existence of corruption 
in economic life of people, it does not matter what 
way it is perceived by economic entities, demands 
more serious and deeper interest of economic 
community. Up to this time everything indicates 
to the fact that exactly approach developed by 
new institutional economics will be that appro-
ach by which scientific economic community will 
markedly affect to this field. The latest tends in 
area of economic analysis of corruption denote to 
very productive connection of new institutional 
economics with new social economics. Both 
disciplines are joined together by interest in role 
of formal and informal institutions in which, as 
we tried to document in previous text, corruption 
represents very important functions. To research 
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of institutions it will be need to dedicate large 
effort and time without doubt and only the future 
validates words of R.Coase [10] that „...when all 
of it will end, main trend of economic thinking will 
become by what we nowadays call new institutio-
nal economics“.
The results of analysis listed in this paper ac-
cording to our opinion don´t miss predicative 
value even for contemporary economic-political 
experience. As was documented in the text, the 
interest in problems of corruption inside of the-
oretic economics disposes also quite concrete 
approaches to the solution of this phenomenon 
and thus it has also importance to problems of 
fight against corruption. We take a view that this 
dimension of theoretic economics ought to be 
used and promoted with corresponding forcibili-
ty, especially in pedagogic process where it can 
enact the role of natural base of profession anti-
-corruption education of rising generation.
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ABSTRACT
REFLECTION OF CORRUPTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THEORIES
Jolana Volejníková
Data relating to corruption could fill up the whole library. Nevertheless, the object of interest 
could be categorized to different spheres: causes of corruption, results of corruption, analyses of 
corruption level in accordance with states, concrete corruption causes, anti-corruption experience 
in single countries and so on. However, a great deal of scientists defends against research on 
corruption and affirms that „what should not have been, it even may not be“. After all, even anti-
-corruption legislation had originated practically always behind schedule (in England not till year 
1889) because there dominated hypocritical tendency to affirm that the problem of corruption in 
this country does not exist. Although there had been written a number of books about corruption 
during overpast decades, really scientific (not only tabloid and journalistic) books and articles on 
the theme of corruption exist only on a small scale, both in terms of foreign and internal literature. 
Approaches to corruption are fragmented and only few approaches try to view to corruption as 
economic problem. That is why we attempt to map the reflection of corruption in historical develo-
pment of economic theories in this text.
This article is concerned with problems of corruption and its theoretic reflection in historical 
development of economic theories. In this context we analyse the period of origin of early eco-
nomic thinking, the period of separation of economics as independent branch of science and 
the period of development of economics during nineteenth and twentieth century that reflected 
paradigm changes within economic theories. We lay specific stress on analysis of the theory of 
public choice and the conception of new institutional economics. In the paper we appear from the 
fact that corruption was, is and as well as in the future it will stay with the most probability one of 
the possible forms of economic behaviour of economic entities with significant impact on quality 
of economy of individual as well as economy of government. Our purpose in submitted paper is 
to discuss whether and which way the problems of corruption was analysed and interpreted by 
economists during historical development of economic theories.
Key Words: corruption, history of economic theories, standard economics, public choice, insti-
tutional economics.
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